quinta-feira, 22 de setembro de 2011


Tension between Turkey and Israel is continuing with conflicting interpretations of events, as well as doses of verbal warfare. It is remarkable that the debate is so structured as to provoke sensitivities and deepen fears on both sides. While the source of traditional fears and anxieties in Israel is the Palestinian question, Turkey’s source of anxiety is the Armenian question and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. Although Turkey’s approach toward the Palestinian question is well-known, the Israeli-PKK relationship is not so. This article aims to contribute to the ongoing debate by focusing on Israeli-PKK relations.

Of course, Israel, keeping a close eye on everything in the Middle East, concerns itself with the Kurdish issue in general and the PKK in particular. As a matter of fact, one of the first strategic pillars of that interest was formed with the immigration of Iraqi Jews to Israel in the post-1945 period and with Iraq’s approach toward the Arab-Israeli wars in the early 1960s. Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s rebellion against the Iraqi regime provided Israel with an opportunity to conduct a proxy war against Iraq. Israel offered the Barzani clan logistical support, military training and new perspectives. The foundations of intelligence organization in the Kurdistan Democratic Party were then laid down by Mossad. By these means, Iraq was made to pay for the support it gave to the Arabs during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars through Barzani’s guerilla attacks. The Iranian shah’s support which helped Israeli intelligence access northern Iraq must also be kept in mind. All these relations were proper in the Cold War spirit. Nevertheless, Israel’s interest continues in different guises. This interest has remained a question in the minds of both the Turkish people and security circles.

Historically, Israel and the PKK were not on good terms. In 1971, the Israeli consul in Istanbul was abducted and killed by Marxist organizations. This caused Israel to focus on leftist organizations in Turkey linked with Palestine.

Quickly, the search focused on Abdullah Öcalan and his organization, the PKK. Öcalan fled from Turkey to Syria in 1979. Then, he settled in Lebanon with the help of Syrian intelligence and the Marxist organizations of Gibril and Havatme and George Habash, the late leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, or PFLP. These three entities were a source of trouble for Israel and started to provide guerilla training to Öcalan’s militants.

In sum, Israeli-PKK relations have featured three phases. The first phase covers the period from the PKK’s establishment to 1992. In this phase, the PKK was a secondary problem which was to be closely watched. The second phase was between 1992 and 2002, when the PKK was subject to low-level diplomatic, but high-level “business” relations within the progressing Turkey-Israeli relationship. The final phase covers the period from 2002 onwards.

When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, it encountered “International Marxist” resistance along with the Palestinian groups. As a Marxist organization, PKK militants fought against the Israeli army, too, losing 11 militants in the battles. An additional 13 militants were captured, imprisoned and interrogated. This enabled Israel to lay hands on a large number of PKK documents. Thus, from early on, Israel has had important information about the PKK. Later, the imprisoned PKK militants were released together with Palestinian Liberation Organization, or PLO, members. They flew to Greece and then moved to Iran. In this process, while Israel perceived the PKK as a threat sponsored by Syria that was to be watched closely, it also shared a large number of documents now in its hands with Turkish intelligence.

After the Cold War, Turkish-Israeli relations took a new shape. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait was a source of trouble for both parties. Saddam, who was then in search of support and legitimacy against the coalition forces, targeted Israel with Scud missiles. Vigorous efforts of Turgut Özal to join the forces to be deployed in an operation to Iraq and close relations with the U.S. brought Turkey and Israel closer.

The post-Cold War era offered new opportunities and created a highly competitive environment for Turkey. On the one hand, there were spheres of influence that opened in the wake of the changing balances in Caucasus and Central Asia, the independence of Azerbaijan, and opportunities in the field of energy policy; on the other hand, there was competition with Russia, Iran and Syria which were anxious about the windows of opportunity that the new foreign policy environment provided for Turkey. All three aimed to destabilize Turkey by increasing their support for the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK as of September 1992. Back then, Israel was the actor providing indirect support to Turkey on the Iranian and Syrian fronts.

As PKK action peaked in May 1993, Turkey was in need of more sophisticated weapons, equipment, intelligence and operational techniques. This helped Turkish-Israeli relations to develop. Israel shared the experience it gained against the “intifada” with Turkey and this helped Turkey inflict significant “casualties” on the PKK. In sum, the PKK threat played a key role in Turkish-Israeli relations. Today we know that Israel played an important role in capturing Öcalan, the jailed PKK leader. The PKK’s attempt to invade Israel’s Berlin consulate in the wake of Öcalan’s capture during which four PKK members were killed by Israeli guards was no coincidence.

Why and how have Turkish-Israeli relations deteriorated? The mutually reinforced suspicions between Israel and the AKP government due to ideological reasons are not the only cause. Other natural causes including the U.S. invasion of Iraq, changing balances in the Middle East, the EU process, the PKK’s loss of its former speed and network, and the decline of the security perspective in domestic politics have brought Turkish-Israeli relations to a new ground. Since the PKK question or at least the military struggle with the PKK is no longer the main topic on the agenda, the Turkish-Israeli “strategic alliance” lost its raison d’etre.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq benefited Israel. As its relations with Turkey worsened, it began to develop a new relationship with the Kurds in northern Iraq, which it had to leave in 1975. Although official circles deny this, it is known that Israel has developed military relations with the northern Iraqi government in the post-invasion era. Considering that the current PKK activities against Iran serve Israeli interests, this does not seem a far-fetched possibility.

The PKK’s ability to find sponsors and provide unlimited services is well known in Ankara. Israel is also aware of this. Nevertheless there are two principles that the leaders of both countries might want to keep in mind. First of all, states establish relationships with non-state organizations not for ideological reasons, but in line with their interests. Secondly, “He who lives in a glass house shouldn’t throw stones at his neighbors.”It is possible to divide Turkey’s experiences in the Kurdish issue into a number of periods: First, the period of problems caused by primitive nationalization practices carried out in the first decades of the Republic; second, the regressive period from the 1960 coup until the 1980 coup; third, a complicated period from the emergence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) through the chaotic 1990s until PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s capture in 1999. Now, in a new period, we are witnessing the actors of the “Old Turkey” systematically searching for any tools to freeze the democratization process.

While the actors of the “New Turkey” and the new Middle East were the ones who stopped resorting to violence or anti-democratic means, the actors of the old order were the ones who failed to give up their weapons. The PKK systematically took up arms again after the beginning of the democratic initiative – something that can be seen as one of the most dramatic examples of the PKK’s existential crisis. The PKK, Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and their anachronistic intellectual colleagues have failed to answer the following, simple question: Would the PKK think about laying down its arms under any circumstances as part of a solution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey? Even hypothetically, they could not imagine disarmament. Apparently, they are quite convinced that both armed struggle and the Kurdish issue will exist indefinitely. Since nothing good happens and in order to reach the limits of revolutionary paradoxes, timeless anachronistic revolution will continue as long as Stalinist fantasies keep being reproduced by Kurdish issue experts and actors.

Let alone providing promising projections which can be taken seriously after a bloody and tragic history of 30 years, the PKK and its political movement have failed to take any initiative to minimize the political and social divergence in Turkey. The PKK’s sole argument is the myth of “the gains of the armed struggle,” which is a great fallacy. It prefers to tilt at windmills rather than be a part of the indispensible democratization process in Turkey. The PKK no longer acts as the most crucial actor in the Kurdish issue; on the contrary, there is now “the PKK issue of the Kurdish issue.” Because of this transformation, the PKK began to ignore the dynamics of the Kurdish issue and put Kurdish nationalism, a naïve imitation of Kemalist nationalism, at the top of its agenda.

For the PKK, the process can only go from the initial “Defeat in the 1990s” to the “Second Defeat” in the 2010s. Following the 1990s, the situation was rectified in the 2000s by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in favor of Kurdish and Turkish people and at the expense of anti-democratic actors. Out of the 2010s, there will ultimately be domestic consolidation that is to the detriment of the PKK and regional groups. Unfortunately in this process, social fraternity will be damaged in the medium term.

It is possible to make certain analyses as to the results of the “revolutionary people’s war” launched by the PKK within the framework of the Middle Eastern proxy wars. The PKK is trying to be taken as a powerful actor in possible future negotiations by putting Turkey in a much more difficult position. Increasing terror will be enough for the PKK to achieve the first step in its aim. However, the cost of this for the PKK will be high: it won’t be able to find a place in the New Turkey, let alone hold onto a more powerful position.

domingo, 18 de setembro de 2011

State of Palestine

O Povo Palestino tem o direito de ter o seu próprio Estado, livre, democrático e soberano! Em 1947, a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) criou o Plano de Partilha da Palestina, que resultou na criação do Estado de Israel. Essa iniciativa criou uma tragédia cotidiana para o povo palestino. Mais de 500 vilas e comunidades palestinas foram destruídas. Milhares foram presos, torturados e assassinados.

Palestinos foram expulsos de suas casas e de centenas de cidades. Cerca de 4,5 milhões de refugiados palestinos vivem hoje pelo mundo, sendo que a maioria destes se encontra nas fronteiras da Palestina ocupada, e o Estado de Israel segue negando o direito de retorno para todos. A ocupação militar israelense, com o apoio das potencias ocidentais, avançou e conquistou novos territórios, em Gaza, Cisjordânia, Jerusalém e até mesmo nas terras sírias das Colinas de Golã e no Sul do Líbano.

Caberá a ONU, com base no direito internacional e em suas próprias resoluções, (em especial a 181, de 1947, que reconhece o Estado da Palestina) ratificar e admitir o Estado da Palestina como membro pleno da organização, caso contrário, será conivente com os crimes cometidos pelo colonialismo israelense contra o povo palestino.

Em setembro deste ano, a Organização para a Libertação da Palestina (OLP), reconhecida internacionalmente como única e legítima representante do povo palestino, irá solicitar da ONU a aprovação do Estado da Palestina como membro pleno desta organização.

Enquanto o povo palestino vem insistindo por uma paz justa para o conflito, os sucessivos governos israelenses continuam não cumprindo as inúmeras resoluções da ONU, mantendo nos cárceres mais de oito mil presos políticos, reprimindo violentamente as manifestações pacíficas de palestinos e israelenses que defendem a criação do Estado da Palestina e seguindo na construção do muro do apartheid ou muro da vergonha, um muro que hoje já tem cerca de 500 km de extensão, e que proíbe a livre circulação de pessoas e produtos entre as cidades e vilas palestinas.

Uma paz justa e duradoura pressupõe a criação, de fato, do Estado da Palestina, e a inclusão deste como membro pleno da ONU, com todos os direitos e deveres que tal decisão implica.

Estados Unidos e Israel comandam a oposição sistemática para que os direitos inalienáveis do povo palestino ao retorno e à autodeterminação não sejam cumpridos.

Se a ONU permitiu a incorporação do Estado de Israel como membro pleno, apesar do mesmo não obedecer aos princípios fundamentais da Carta das Nações Unidas, e de violar cotidianamente os direitos humanos, econômicos, sociais, políticos e culturais dos palestinos, é preciso que o Estado da Palestina também tenha o direito de existir plenamente já.

Apoiaremos as mobilizações populares dos palestinos que lutam contra o governo antidemocrático de Israel. Nós, militantes de organizações representativas do povo brasileiro, afirmamos: apoiar o povo palestino é apoiar todos os povos em sua caminhada de paz, justiça e liberdade!

Ouçam as vozes do povo brasileiro: Estado da Palestina Já!

Vídeo produzido pela TV Vermelho
Direção: Toni C.
Narração e Tradução: Assad Frangieh
Revisão: Humberto Alencar
Logotipo: Andocides Bezerra
Apoio: Carla Santos

sábado, 10 de setembro de 2011

Mahmoud Abbas , Mr. Obama’s .

Among the very first foreign leaders President Obama called after entering the Oval Office on Jan. 21, 2009, was the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. The last time the two men spoke was in February, when Mr. Obama failed, in an awkward, 55-minute phone conversation, to persuade Mr. Abbas not to go to the United Nations to condemn Israel for building Jewish settlements.

The 25 months between those calls demonstrate how Mr. Obama’s relationship with Mr. Abbas has withered — and along with it, Mr. Obama’s hopes to make Middle East peacemaking one of his signature achievements.

Later this month, the Palestinians seem determined to go to the United Nations again, this time to ask for recognition of a Palestinian state, a move the United States has vowed to oppose. But Mr. Obama has no plans to call Mr. Abbas, a senior administration official said, because it is clear that the president can say little to stop him. (The United States blocked the last Palestinian resolution as well.)

“The beginning of their relationship was good — auspicious, actually,” said Ziad J. Asali, the president of the American Task Force on Palestine. “But then decisions, mistakes and reality changed the relationship.”

American and Palestinian officials insist that there is no animosity between Mr. Obama and Mr. Abbas, unlike the often tense relationship between the president and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel. But Mr. Abbas has lost faith in Mr. Obama, Palestinian officials said, and after four face-to-face meetings and many regular telephone calls, there is now little contact between them.

This is a sharp contrast to former President Bill Clinton, who met frequently with the last Palestinian leader, Yasir Arafat, even if that relationship ultimately soured, too — or even to former President George W. Bush, who built a decent working relationship with Mr. Abbas during his effort to achieve a peace agreement.

Personal diplomacy has its limits in the Middle East, given the deep historic and political hurdles to an agreement. But it can help at times, former diplomats said, noting that Mr. Clinton used his charm with Mr. Arafat to get him to sign a deal with Mr. Netanyahu at the Wye River talks in 1998. Mr. Obama has also cultivated other leaders in the region, notably Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey.

The lack of high-level contact will be telling in the coming weeks. While the White House has worked behind the scenes to head off the Palestinian campaign, Mr. Obama himself has stayed conspicuously offstage, leaving the effort to State Department diplomats and to Tony Blair, the special envoy to the diplomatic group known as the Quartet, which comprises the United States, the United Nations, the European Union and Russia.

On Thursday, Mr. Abbas rebuffed a last-ditch appeal by the United States not to go to the United Nations, telling reporters it had come “too late.” His comments came after meeting with two senior American officials.

“The administration’s body language is conveying fatigue,” said Robert Malley, director of the Middle East program at the International Crisis Group. “It’s going to take a lot to persuade the president that it’s worth political capital to try to revive this.”

Indeed, in some political circles here, there is an argument that an American veto of the Palestinian resolution would be just fine, since it would win Mr. Obama favor with Jewish voters going into an election year. But it is a remarkable turn of events, given that the president began his Middle East peacemaking bid faster and with greater ambition than virtually any of his predecessors.

Among Palestinians, the disappointment is all the more acute because their hopes for Mr. Obama were so high. Judging by Mr. Obama’s background, temperament and worldview, Palestinians expected him to bring a new focus to the peace process and a greater sympathy for the Palestinian cause. It did not go unnoticed that he is friends with a prominent Palestinian-American scholar, Rashid Khalidi.

Mr. Obama named a high-profile special envoy to the region, George J. Mitchell Jr. He also spoke empathetically about the suffering of the Palestinian people in Gaza after an Israeli military campaign against Hamas there. And the president’s demand of Israel that it freeze settlement construction cheered the Palestinians, who believed that would remove a stubborn hurdle to a peace deal.

“We hoped a lot that in his administration, there would be real progress,” said Nabil Shaath, who leads the foreign affairs department of Fatah, the main party of the Palestinian Authority. “But later on, disappointment set in,” Mr. Shaath said in a telephone interview from Ramallah on the West Bank. “He really could not deliver what he promised in terms of a cessation of settlement activity.”

When Mr. Netanyahu refused to extend a moratorium on construction, Mr. Abbas felt let down. And he blamed Mr. Obama for leading him on. In an interview with Newsweek in April, Mr. Abbas said: “It was Obama who suggested a full settlement freeze. I said O.K., I accept. We both went up the tree. After that, he came down with a ladder and he removed the ladder and said to me, jump.”

The Israelis have long contended that negotiations should not be subject to any preconditions, and they view the Palestinians’s focus on settlements as a pretext to avoid serious negotiations.

The Americans have their own frustrations. Some officials doubt that Mr. Abbas is willing to take risks to pursue an agreement. His regular threats to step down as the Palestinian Authority’s leader make some question why Mr. Obama should make an investment in him. And with no hope of progress, they ask what would be gained by putting the president in touch with him.

“You pick your moments based on where you think the diplomacy is,” a senior official said. “The president’s currency is so valuable in diplomacy that if you don’t husband it, then you don’t have it when you need it.”

One thing both the Americans and the Palestinians agree on is that this is not one of those moments. Mr. Abbas has written off the prospect of a new American initiative for the rest of Mr. Obama’s term, Mr. Shaath said.

Still, noting that Mr. Abbas “keeps high esteem for the man,” Mr. Shaath said he “retains the hope that President Obama will be re-elected.”

“Maybe in his second term, he will deliver what he couldn’t in his first term.”

domingo, 4 de setembro de 2011

Janderson & Anderson

Janderson & Anderson

Excelente dupla do ritimo sertanejo , com musicas que levam bons arranjos e otimas letras , na verdade o ritimo agrada em cheio o publico urbano , indefinido as vezes mas bem ritimado , embora não seja adepto do genero me chamou a atenção pela criatividade ,pela ousadia em misturar alguns generos , uma ousadia criativa que desde o The Band eu não encontrava , muito bom , falta o video que certamente vira em breve , .

Anderson Luiz de Oliveira ou simplesmente Anderson
Assim segue a vida deste rapaz que nasceu na cidade de Curitiba-PR, e atualmente mora no município de Maringá no mesmo estado. A história musical começa por influencia e apoio de seu Pai. Anderson começou a tocar violão quando era ainda garoto e aos 11 anos de idade ganhou sua primeira viola instrumento esse, que o fez abandonar o velho violão. Com o incentivo do seu avô começou a cantarolar nas rodas de viola de sua cidade, no repertório tocava canções de grandes nomes que marcaram a história da música raiz, dentre eles Lourenço e Lourival, Zico e Zeca e Tião Carreiro e Pardinho. Nas idas e vindas que a vida nos leva, o encontro com o parceiro e amigo Janderson, foi pouco casual.

Janderson Dias Moraes o determinado Janderson
Jeito simplão que leva na garganta um Vozeirão de causar impacto a primeira vista. Nascido na cidade de Maringa-PR, se interessou por violão quando tinha 10 anos de idade, e seu vizinho o Sr. Cardoso o ensinou o modesto pouco que sabe, vizinho este, que Janderson perturbava muito para apreender os acordes que mais tarde poderia dar uma revira volta em sua vida. O que o garoto sempre quis, era aprender viola caipira e foi aos 17 anos, que seu Pai José Dias o presenteou com o instrumento. O tempo foi passando e o rapaz formou parceria com alguns amigos que veio a não vingar. O parceiro ideal estava muito próximo, até que no dia 1 de maio de 2008 vinham a se encontrar e pontear violas juntos em uma churrascaria em sua terra natal.

Telefone: 11 3868 2728 (Rossana)
Celular: 44 9835 7290 / 44 8818 1045 (Zé Dias)

Silvio Rodriguez | Zé Dias

sábado, 3 de setembro de 2011

Estádio do Corinthians . Festa para assinatura do contrato entre a Odebrecht e o Corinthians.

O ex-presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva compareceu, neste sábado (03), ao ato de assinatura do contrato entre a Odebrecht e o Corinthians para a construção do estádio do clube que irá abrigar os jogos da Copa do Mundo de 2014 em São Paulo.

Corintiano, o ex-presidente foi ao evento como convidado. Mais disposto, depois de vistoriar as obras em Itaquera ao lado de Andrés, o ex-presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva falou sobre o assunto quando discursava para o público presente na festa corintiana. Ele lembrou que já trabalhou em prol do Morumbi como sede paulista da Copa de 2014 e foi brevemente vaiado.

"Fui visitar o Morumbi na época. Achamos que seria o lugar ideal. Não sei por que não deu certo. Só quem pode responder isso é o Juvenal [Juvêncio, presidente do São Paulo] e os presidentes da Fifa e da CBF. Eles não quiseram", eximiu-se Lula, voltando a ser ovacionado quando se posicionou como Andrés Sanchez.

“Não foi o estádio do Corinthians que entrou na Copa do Mundo. Foi a Copa do Mundo que entrou no estádio do Corinthians”, afirmou, ressaltando que a arena iria ser construída de qualquer forma.

Lula visitou as obras ao lado de Andrés Sanchez, presidente do clube, e agradeceu Emílio Odebrecht, presidente do conselho da empresa, por ter começado a construção 90 dias antes de o contrato ser assinado, e pediu à imprensa que a obra fosse bem fiscalizada para sair da melhor forma possível.

O Sport Club Corinthians Paulista conquistou mais um passo importante referente ao tão esperado estádio alvinegro. No evento em comemoração aos 101 anos do clube, o presidente Andrés Sanchez assinou o contrato de construção da futura casa do Timão com a Odebretch.
Na última quinta-feira (01), as primeiras colunas do estádio já haviam sido instaladas em Itaquera.

O estádio do Corinthians, na zona leste da cidade de São Paulo, terá capacidade para 48 mil torcedores. Para sediar a abertura da Copa de 2014 no Brasil, a Fifa prevê 65 mil lugares. Com a exigência, serão adicionados 20 mil assentos removíveis, ficando um total de 68 mil. Os assentos excedentes serão retirados após o encerramento da Copa.

O estádio próprio viabilizará um sonho de longa data do Clube. Odebrecht e Corinthians iniciaram em 2004 os primeiros contatos para a construção e, em 2010, como parte das comemorações do centenário corintiano, foi firmado um primeiro acordo entre as duas partes. Em julho de 2011, o novo estádio ficou orçado em R$ 820 milhões. Neste valor, já estão incluídos os serviços iniciais de terraplanagem e preparação do terreno do futuro estádio, cujas obras estão sendo executadas desde 30 de maio.

O projeto do futuro estádio do Corinthians, de autoria do arquiteto Anibal Coutinho, prevê que ele tenha instalações para receber 32 Chefes de Estado, representantes dos países que irão disputar a Copa no Brasil. Também haverá estrutura para o trabalho simultâneo de cinco mil jornalistas de todas as partes do mundo.

 Só de bater os olhos no projeto percebe-se o formato retangular, distinto dos ovais que predominam no país.

Outra característica que chama a atenção são os vãos livres, que, segundo Anibal Coutinho, autor do projeto, imprime à obra sua "cara paulistana", lembrando o Masp, de Lina Bo Bardi.

Pelo menos no papel, com tecnologia de última geração: quatro telões de 800 polegadas, de área equivalente a uma quadra de vôlei, ar-condicionado em todas as dependências e um painel de células fotovoltaicas que gerarão energia para o sistema.

Com 148.620 m² de área construída e prazo de entrega fixado para dezembro de 2013, o Itaquerão será um dos maiores estádios da Copa-14.

O cenário político indica que a arena tem grande possibilidade de abrir o Mundial, dada a proximidade entre o presidente corintiano, Andres Sanchez, e o homem forte do COL (Comitê Organizador Local), Ricardo Teixeira.

O anúncio oficial acontecerá em outubro e gera expectativa, pois a abertura é um evento mais caro e complexo que a própria final da competição, que será no Maracanã.

A capacidade do estádio de 48 mil lugares, então, aumentará em 20 mil, por meio de arquibancadas provisórias.

A concepção do futuro estádio corintiano, feita pelo escritório Coutinho, Diegues, Cordeiro/DDG, prevê um shopping center agregado à arena, com área para abrigar 59 concessões (lojas, lanchonetes, restaurantes, bares temáticos, espaço para exposições, auditório etc.).

Haverá ainda 89 camarotes, para 1.423 pessoas sentadas, quatro deles com área de 470 m, e 48 sanitários. O complexo terá sistema de reaproveitamento de águas pluviais para utilização em descargas e na irrigação do gramado.

No pico das obras, a previsão é que sejam utilizados, no mínimo, 1.500 homens.

O projeto prevê dois estacionamentos cobertos e dois a céu aberto, com cerca de 3.000 vagas. Durante a Copa, porém, o local será usado por caminhões de equipamentos.

Estágio atual
Nessa primeira etapa, estão sendo realizados serviços preliminares de terraplanagem, instalação do canteiro de obras (escritórios, restaurante, ambulatório médico etc.), remoção de interferências e colocação das primeiras estacas.
Empregos gerados
Durante o pico das obras, serão 1.500.
Em agosto de 2011, são 350.

Itaquera, bairro da zona leste de São Paulo (SP)
Modelo de Contrato
Contrato privado entre Corinthians e Odebrecht.
R$ 820 milhões, em julho de 2010.
Início das obras
30 de maio de 2011.